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abstract
the scope of the paper is to review the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and 
conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative 
approaches are in fact complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a 
unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game 
theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological 
view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. the interaction between these alternative (and, some-
times, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordi-
nation takes place,  there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
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rEsuMEn
el objetivo de este artículo es presentar la literatura que emplea los juegos de coordinación para el estudio de 
normas y convenciones sociales, que se han analizado tanto desde el punto de vista de  la teoría de juegos 
como de la psicología cognitiva. argumentamos en este trabajo que estos dos enfoques alternativos son 
en realidad complementarios, dado que ambos contribuyen al entendimiento de los procesos mediante los 
cuales las personas llegan a coordinarse en un único sistema de expectativas autorrealizadas, en presencia 
de múltiples convenciones todas ellas igualmente viables. Mientras que la teoría de juegos explica la apari-
ción de convenciones basándose en argumentos de eficiencia y comportamientos frente al riesgo, el enfoque 
de la psicología cognitiva utiliza en mayor medida consideraciones referidas al entorno y naturaleza de las 
decisiones. La interacción entre estos efectos diferentes (y en ocasiones, rivales) desemboca con frecuencia 
en fallos de coordinación y, aun cuando la coordinación se produce, no hay garantía de que la convención 
en vigor sea la más eficiente.
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introduction
Behavioral game theory combines the standard game-theoretic approach of strategic 
situations with the analysis of their psychological regularities. these regularities should 
be able to link the study of economic environments to the insights of (mostly cognitive) 
psychology (camerer & Loewenstein, 2003). In the words of eric van Damme, (1999: 
204): “Without having a broad set of facts on which to theorize, there is a certain danger 
of spending too much time on models that are mathematically elegant, yet have little 
connection to actual behavior. at present our empirical knowledge is inadequate and it is 
an interesting question why game theorists have not turned more frequently to psycho-
logists for information about the learning and information processing processes used by 
humans.”
 In this paper, we apply behavioral game theory to study the dynamics of conven-
tions and social norms, that is, codes of conduct widespread enough to justify their 
adoption by each individual, taken individually (Lewis, 1969). Within the realm of beha-
vioral game theory, conventions emerge as solutions of specific coordination games, 
i.e., strategic environments characterized by multiple (nash) equilibria. these games 
are used to explain the emergence of conventions and social norms. real-life exam-
ples that could be represented by this class of games abound: the use of a particular 
language, driving on the left or right, adoption of new information technologies, or the 
gathering of business activities in a particular place. It is only worthwhile speaking a 
language  if others around speak the same language. Driving on the right only makes 
sense  if others do the same; driving on the right in the UK is certainly not a smart 
thing to do. Whether or not to buy a fax machine depends on whether the people you 
communicate with have it or not. on a more large-scale level, the emergence of silicon 
valley as a centre of technological innovation comes from the concentration and coor-
dination of activities in the 1990s of various IT firms and research facilities in the area. 
as we shall see, any game that has more than one equilibrium hides a potential coor-
dination problem, which standard game theory often leaves unsolved. the interaction 
between theoretical and psychological insights, typical of the behavioral approach, has 
proven to be very useful in providing explanations on the emergence of conventional 
patterns. 
 coordination problems display two common features. First, the potential multiplicity 
of (equilibrium) outcomes: given the prevailing convention, there is always an alterna-
tive set of conventions, each of which could play the same social function. It is some-
times possible to justify the selection of a given convention on the basis of its greater 
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efficiency, or smaller cost. This would be the standard “economic approach” to the 
study of social norms. However, in many situations, the explanation of the emergence 
of a specific convention is not as intuitive. Sometimes conventions appear to have 
been selected, in the words of thomas schelling (1963:70), by their intrinsic magne-
tism, and it is very difficult to recover their economic justification. Schelling defines this 
property using the term salience, emphasizing its inherent empirical content: “salience 
could derive from pre-play communication among the players, but it could arise in other 
ways. It could arise by precedent. In fact, since salience is a psychological rather than 
a logical notion, the ways in which salience may arise are as various as the possible 
psychologies of the players.” The second common feature is related with the difficulty of 
justifying the adoption of a particular convention beyond the mere fact that it is followed 
by everyone: its use does not seem directly associated with a rational calculation but 
determined, and to some extent imposed, by the social and institutional context in 
which economic agents operate. Under this interpretation, individuals express through 
conventions their nature of social subjects, rather than creatures guided solely by the 
pursuit of their individual preferences, as economic theory often assumes (although 
social preferences are being incorporated to explain human behavior, see Brandts 
and Fatas, 2012). elster (1989:99) describes the tension between these two souls, the 
Homo economicus and the Homo sociologicus: “of these, the former is supposed to be 
guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social 
norms. the former is “pulled” by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is 
“pushed” from behind by quasi-inertial forces.” 
 In this paper, we shall illustrate these ideas by introducing the basics of coordina-
tion games, together with their standard treatment. We then survey some contributions 
which analyze conventions using behavioral game theory. as in a regular bridge table, 
the economic agents described by game theory suffer, more or less consciously, the 
consequences of their interdependence: the results obtained by each agent depend, 
to some extent, on the choices made by all. In the course of this review, we will refer to 
that branch of the theory, here defined as non-cooperative, which tries to model eco-
nomic situations in which the institutional context does not allow the implementation of 
binding agreements. 
 as we noticed previously, any particular convention is always hiding a coordination 
game. In such games, the preferences of the players coincide, in the intuitive sense that 
if two people aim to meet, they should show up at the same time and place, in which case 
a “convention”, i.e., a coordination device, can be characterized in terms of its efficiency, 
or lower risk in case such coordination may not take place.
 As we will see, standard game theory has difficulties in predicting the outcome of 
coordination games. Hence, in section 3 we show how behavioral game theory may 
inform game theory on the mechanics of the convention selection process. In identifying 
these “psychological effects”, section 4 argues that it is indeed the combination of psy-
chological reasoning and strategic thinking what helps us to solve coordination problems 
in everyday life.
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coordination GaMEs
the purpose of this section is to introduce some basic game-theoretic concepts often 
used to illustrate this behavioral approach to the emergence of conventions. We start 
with the exposition of the simplest class of strategic models, namely, 2 x 2 games. these 
are simultaneous-move games in which two players have just two options (“strategies”) 
at their disposal. Figure 1 sketches the stereotypical coordination game, Choosing sides, 
where two players (call them “ann” and “Ben”) must simultaneously choose a number, 
either X or y. If their choices match, they both “win” (i.e., they get 1); if their choices do 
not match, they both “lose” (i.e., they get 0). this is the classic pattern of a coordination 
game: the important thing is to select the same behavior, no matter which one (and, to 
some extent, how, or why).
Figure 1. 
Game 1: Choosing Sides
a\B X y
X 1,1 0,0
y 0,0 1,1
the matrix of Figure 1 reports the so called “strategic form” of the game: each row 
(column) corresponds to one possible strategy available to ann (Ben), each cell of the 
resulting matrix contains two numbers, the first of which refers to Ann (row player), and 
the second to Ben (column player). Thus, the strategic form of a game specifies the 
following elements:
•	 I, the set of players (ann and Ben, in our example); 
•	 Si, the strategy set for each player i (here Si                  , i = A, B); 
•           defines player i’s utility (or payoff) associated with all possible outcomes resul-
ting from game play and indicates i’s preference ranking over the final outcomes. For 
example, in game 1 ann prefers to coordinate with Ben, although she is indifferent 
regarding coordinating on (X, X) or (Y, Y).
game theorists often invoke Nash equilibria as game solutions, i.e., reasonable predic-
tions on how play may evolve in specific strategic environments. Loosely speaking, a 
nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies that is robust to “unilateral deviations”: 
given the (equilibrium) behavior of the others, no player can achieve a higher payoff 
by deviating from equilibrium behavior. as for game 1, there are two nash equilibria: 
πi (•)
€ 
≡ {X ,Y}	  
€ 
≡ {X ,Y}	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namely, (X, X) and (Y, Y). In both cases, each player plays the strategy that gives her the 
largest payoff, given the strategy of the other. 
 Hence, for Choosing sides, game theory provides two alternative equilibrium solu-
tions. the coordination problem implicit in the emergence of a convention can be then 
rephrased as follows: which of these two nash equilibria is going to be played? Can 
game theory make any prediction here? the answer is, basically, “no”. since both equi-
libria are identical from a strategic point of view, no game-theoretic concept can help to 
resolve the coordination problem implicit in the selection of a specific convention. As a 
result, coordination failure is likely to occur.
 as mentioned above, Choosing sides can be considered as a stereotypical coordina-
tion problem. note, though, that game 1 is not the only possible representation of such a 
strategic situation. Figure 2 reports some alternative 2 x 2 coordination games that may 
serve the same purpose:
Figure 2.
Other coordination games
 
 
as Figure 2 shows, the cells on the main diagonal of all games, i.e. all cases in which 
both players opt for the same strategy, are nash equilibria (and, therefore, potential 
conventions).  However, there are also some important differences. In particular, while 
in games 1 and 3 both nash equilibria are associated with the same payoff, (1 and 
2, respectively), in games 2 and 4 one of the two equilibria is preferred by both pla-
yers, i.e., there exists a unique Pareto-efficient equilibrium. And yet, while in Games 
1 to 4 players’ equilibrium payoffs are always equal to each other (i.e. players value 
equilibria in the same way), in game 5 players differ in their evaluations on which nash 
equilibrium should be selected, as ann prefers (Y, Y) since she would get 2, instead 
of 1, while Ben’s preferences are exactly reversed, he prefers the outcome (X, X). 
Finally, while in games 1, 2 and 5 both strategies are associated with the same out-
of-equilibrium payoff pair, (0,0), in games 3 and 4 strategy Y gives players a higher 
out-of equilibrium payoff. Hence, playing Y in games 3 and 4 is, somewhat, “less risky” 
(see garcía-gallego et al, 201, on attitudes toward risky choices). all these examples 
suggest that both efficiency and risk may be used by players as criteria for evaluating 
the success (or failure) of a specific convention.  
a\B X Y a\B X Y a\B X Y a\B X y
X 1,1 0,0 X 2,2 0,1 X 4,4 0,2 X 1,2 0,0
Y 0,0 2,2 Y 1,0 2,2 Y 2,0 3,3 y 0,0 2,1
game 2
common interest
game 3
risk Dominance
game 4
stag-Hunt
game 5
Battle of the sexes
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How PEoPlE bEHavE in coordination GaMEs
this section focuses on solutions proposed by behavioral game theorists to solve coor-
dination problems. these theories of “equilibrium selection” have received considerable 
attention by theorists and have been tested extensively in the lab (see the excellent 
surveys of ochs, 1995 and camerer, 2003). these selection devices are based on i) 
the (payoff) structure of the game (and, in this sense, rely on game-theoretic criteria); or 
are based on ii) psychological framing (and, in this sense, rely mostly on psychological 
principles). 
 as for the former, payoff and risk dominance, both proposed by Harsanyi and selten 
(1988) in their influential book on equilibrium selection, are the main selection criteria put 
forward by game-theorists. a nash equilibrium is said to be payoff-dominant if it is Pareto-
superior to all other nash equilibria in a game, that is, if another equilibrium does not exist 
that yields higher payoffs to all players. In this respect, the selection criterion of payoff 
dominance is based on collective rationality. this concept can predict the outcome of 
games 2 and 4. In games 1, 3 and 5 though, it does not solve the coordination problem, 
since both equilibria are equally efficient. The other criterion, namely risk-dominance, 
applies to all symmetric coordination games characterized by the strategic form shown 
in Figure 3.  In this case the nash equilibrium (X, X) is said to be risk-dominant if a +b 
> c +d, i.e., if the sum of payoffs associated with the use of its strategy is higher. Har-
sanyi and selten (1988) justify risk-dominance on the ground of the so-called “principle of 
insufficient reason”, first enunciated by Jakob Bernoulli, then popularized by John May-
nard Keynes (1921:42), in his well-known Treatise on Probability: “if there is no known 
reason for predicating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, 
then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an 
equal probability.” In our context, the risk-dominant strategy is the one that maximizes 
players’ expected payoffs in the absence of any view on the other player’s behavior (i.e., 
considering either strategy equally probable). It is the strategy that minimizes the risks 
associated with the possibility that coordination does not take place. 
Figure 3.
A symmetric 2 x 2 coordination game; a > c and d > b
a\B X Y
X a,a b,c
Y c,b d,d
Note that payoff dominance, as defined here, differs from the concept of strategic domi-
nance. Payoff dominance selects among nash equilibria (i.e. combinations of strate-
gies for all players), while strategic dominance selects among possible strategies of a 
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particular individual. For player i, strategy X strategically dominates y if the payoff from 
playing the former always exceeds the payoff from playing the latter, independently of the 
behaviour of opponents. For a more formal definition, see for example Vega-Redondo 
(2003). the term “symmetric” refers to the fact that the strategic situation faced by each 
player is exactly the same: their decision problems do not depend on her role or identity. 
In a symmetric game, the strategy space of the players, as well as the structure of their 
preferences coincide. adherence to a convention does not mean, however, that they 
should behave equally: at a road cross an agreement must establish who has priority, 
and who must give way; both drivers have the same options but the convention provides 
each of them with a different behavior (sugden, 1986). 
 Hence, in game 2, the equilibrium (Y, Y) is both payoff and risk-dominant. In game 
3, instead, both equilibria are equally Pareto efficient, but only (Y, Y) is risk-dominant. 
Finally, game 4, known in the literature as the ‘stag-hunt game’, represents a situation in 
which the Pareto-optimality conflicts with risk-dominance: (X, X) is payoff-dominant, but 
(Y, Y) is risk-dominant. If a player has psychological predispositions to avoid risky deci-
sions, she may prefer to choose action Y in this game. 
 This latter game, where exists a conflict between payoff and risk-dominance, has 
been extensively studied experimentally to see how subjects resolve this tension in the 
absence of a clear-cut theoretical predicament. In this respect, the experimental evi-
dence shows a clear preference toward the risk-dominant solution (see, among others, 
van Huyck, Battalio & Beil (1990, 1991), cooper & John (1988) and cooper & ross 
(1985)). these results have inspired a vast theoretical literature which highlights, often 
invoking evolutionary arguments, the stability properties of the risk-dominant solution, 
(see, among others, crawford, 1991; Kandori, Mailath & rob, 1993 or young , 1993)
 Moving towards equilibrium selection criteria based on psychological motives, 
schelling (1963) introduces the concept of focal points, based on the idea —discussed 
earlier— that some actions are more salient than others. For example, in the case of 
game 1, shelling (1963) shows that action relabeling (from X and Y to Heads and Tails) 
leads to a very high coordination frequency on the (Heads, Heads) equilibrium. explain-
ing this evidence, schelling argues that salience is a “cultural conventional priority” that 
enables people to coordinate on Heads. the effect of framing/relabeling has been recon-
firmed in a variety of contexts in subsequent experiments (for example, Mehta, Starmer 
& sudgen, 1994; Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997; or rojo, 2010).
 schelling’s (1963) seminal experiments well explain his methodology in the study of 
coordination problems. In his well-known thought experiment, schelling asked subjects to 
choose independently and without communication where in new york city they would try 
to meet one another. those who chose the same meeting location as their partner would 
receive a positive (hypothetical) payoff, equal to that of their partner’s and independent of 
the specific location. Those who did not would receive a zero payoff. Despite the plethora 
of possible meeting locations, a majority of subjects chose grand central station, which 
was the most salient traffic hub in New York at the time, yielding a high expected coordi-
nation rate. on the basis of his results, schelling concluded that even though traditional 
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game theory allows no role for the salience of decision labels, many situations “provide 
some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectations of 
what the other expects him to be expected to do” (schelling 1963:67). 
 this example clearly applies to symmetric games, where players have identical pref-
erences on which equilibrium they should coordinate on (this is the case of games 1 to 
4. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to find real-life examples in which players 
evaluations of the potential conventions are perfectly aligned (for example, ann may 
prefer to meet at the empire state Building, instead of grand central station, simply 
because she leaves nearby). this is exactly the case of game 5, known as the Battle of 
the Sexes, where players have strong incentives to coordinate, but opposite views on 
which action to coordinate. not surprisingly, these are the games in which coordination 
is more difficult to be achieved experimentally (the mismatch amounted to 52% and 
59% in Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross, 1990 and 1994, respectively). Along similar 
lines, Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (2007) find evidence that labeling salience 
is an effective coordination device in symmetric pure coordination games (where “pure” 
here simply means that, like in our Game 1, all equilibria are equally efficient). How-
ever, salience performs poorly in asymmetric games, where its “magnetic power” con-
flicts with players’ (asymmetric) incentives in following one convention, rather than 
another.
 Which are the cognitive mechanisms that may help players to select a particular 
convention in this case? rapoport (1997) designs an experiment to test whether the 
existence of an order of play (without any information disclosed on the actions taken 
along the sequence) has a psychological effect on the equilibrium selection process. the 
theory we presented so far abstracts from the order of the play since, if the late-mover 
does not observe the predecessors’ actions, their information is exactly the same as 
first-movers (and the game can be treated as if moves were simultaneous). Neverthe-
less, rapoport (1997) shows that the mere existence of an order of play reduces the 
mismatch rate to 34%, as if both players were giving Ann a “first-mover advantage”, just 
as if her action were observed by Benn (this would be indeed the so-called subgame-
perfect solution put forward by reinhart selten (1975) in his famous paper). clearly, this 
advantage is purely fictitious (since Anna’s actions are not observed), but it is sufficient, 
in this case, to act as a coordinating device. Since the timing influences both the first and 
second-movers, the chronological structure of the game makes certain outcomes more 
salient and coordination takes place.
PsycHoloGy or GaME tHEory? or botH?
Is the effect of focal points purely psychological or is it a combination of psychological 
focus and strategic thinking? Mehta, starmer and sudgen (1994) design a smart test of 
this issue. In their experiment, two groups of subjects are presented an identical set of 
options. In one group, people only choose the options they like without any further conse-
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quence on others. In the second group, payoffs depend on the number of individuals who 
choose the same action. If strategic thinking played no role, the frequency of individuals 
selecting the salient option should be roughly the same across treatments. If more people 
chose the focal action in the second treatment, this would provide evidence in favor 
of strategic thinking, since people recognize and choose the salient option more often 
precisely as they believe the others will do the same. In this sense, strategic reasoning 
reinforces the psychological (“framing”) effect. 
 their results clearly show that there is strategic reasoning behind the decisions of 
experimental subjects. For instance, choosing between “Heads” and “Tails”, 76.1% of 
individuals choose “heads” in the first treatment, vs. 86.7% in the second. This effect is 
even larger in other cases. When their english experimental subjects are asked to name 
a city, in the non-strategic treatment London is the most frequent option, named by 15.9% 
of the sample, this frequency goes up to 55.6% in the second treatment. 
 Herrero, Moreno and Ponti (2010) explore the role of moral principles as coordinating 
devices in the context of bankruptcy problems. they report an experimental study on 
three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating conflicting claims: the constrained 
equal awards rule (which privileges, in the allocation of the estate, smaller claims), the 
constrained equal losses (which privileges bigger claims) and the proportional rule (in 
which losses are distributed proportionally to claims and, therefore, favors middle claim-
ants). They first let groups of 3 subjects (with increasing claims) play three mechanisms 
designed in such a way that the unique (nash) equilibrium allocation coincides with the 
recommendation of one of these three rules. In addition, they asked subjects to play 
an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy combinations in 
which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict nash equilibrium, leading 
to a 3-player version of a coordination game analogous to the Battle of the Sexes, since 
subjects are characterized by different claims and, therefore, strictly prefer the allocation 
dictated by one of the three rules over the others. While in the first three games subjects’ 
play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional 
rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. In order to explain such a clear-
cut behavior, they administer a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking 
them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same problems played 
in the lab. also in this case, respondents were sensitive to the framing of the ques-
tions, but the proportional rule was selected by the vast majority of respondents. this 
result highlights the pivotal role of the proportional rule as a coordinating device. taking 
for granted (given the questionnaire results) that the proportional rule seems to better 
suit our subjects’ sense of distributional justice in bankruptcy situations, it seems that 
this commonly shared moral judgment acts as a coordination device in the coordination 
game experiment, where both the high and the low claimants renounce to their first-best 
solution to ease coordination. If that were the case, the choice of the proportional rule 
as a coordinating device could be interpreted as evidence of the power of social norms 
to enhance coordination and cooperation within a society (see, among others, gauthier, 
1986; skyrms, 1996 and Binmore, 1998). 
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conclusions
In this brief review, we have argued that the interpretation of a convention as a social 
norm may overshadow its strategic characterization; people usually adhere to a con-
vention without wondering why. nevertheless, the description of the strategic elements 
implied by a particular convention —modeled here in terms of a nash equilibrium of a 
coordination game— may help explain how conventions are established and, in certain 
circumstances, why they have been selected.
 on the other hand, our evidence also shows that psychological factors play an impor-
tant role in determining which conventions will be selected, especially where game theory 
makes no prediction. carefully designed experiments allow scholars to separate these 
strategic and psychological effects, showing that they are both equally important. the 
incorporation of psychological regularities into formal models may improve their predic-
tive power and our understanding of social conventions.  
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